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Abstract 
 
What explains the cross-national variation in inflation rates in developed countries? Previous 
literature has emphasised the role of ideas and institutions, and to a lesser extent interest 
groups, while leaving the role of electoral politics comparatively unexplored. This paper 
seeks to redress this neglect by focusing on one case where electoral politics matters for 
inflation: the share of the population above 65 years old in a country. I argue that countries 
with a larger share of elderly have lower inflation because older people are both more 
inflation averse and politically powerful, forcing governments to pursue lower inflation. I test 
my argument in three steps. First, logistic regression analysis of survey data confirms older 
people are more inflation averse. Second, panel data regression analysis of party manifesto 
data reveals that European countries with more old people have more economically orthodox 
political parties. Third, time series cross-section regression analyses demonstrate that the 
share of the elderly is negatively correlated with inflation in both a sample of 21 advanced 
OECD economies and a larger sample of 175 countries. Ageing may therefore push 
governments to adopt a low inflation regime. 
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The impact of the elderly on inflation rates 
in developed countries 
 
 
What explains the cross-national variation in inflation rate across developed 
countries? This question has been the focus of a large body of literature in 
both economics and comparative political economy. However, most studies to 
date have focused on the role of ideas, institutions and economic factors1, and 
to a lesser extent interest groups,2 while ignoring the role of electoral politics 
in particular. While the conventional wisdom captures part of the story for 
understanding variation in inflation rates, the relative absence of electoral 
politics is surprising in two respects. First, this absence is at odds with the 
prominent role attributed to domestic electoral politics in other policy 
domains, such as labour market policies,3 pensions,4 and the welfare state5 
more generally. Second, inflation has clearly identifiable distributive effects 
among on parts of the population who should therefore care about the level 
of inflation.  
 
In this paper, I contend that electoral politics matter in the sense that the 
preferences of the electorate have an impact on the variation of inflation rates 
across time and countries. By looking at the preferences of different groups, 
electoral politics makes it possible to understand why certain ideas and 
institutions are chosen in the first place. Addressing this gap also helps us 
make sense of the variation in inflation rates among countries that have fairly 
similar institutions and economies. However, showing that electoral politics 
                                                        
1 E.g. Mc Namara 1998; Cuckierman 1992; Hancke 2013; Iversen 1999; Grilli, Masciandaro, and 
Tabellini 1991. The next section reviews this literature in more detail. 
2 For an exception focusing on financial sector’s opposition to inflation see Posen 1993, 1995. 
3 E.g. Boix, 1999; Rueda, 2007. 
4 E.g. Hauserman, 2010. 
5 E.g. Pierson 1994, 1998. 
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matters requires sidestepping two methodological pitfalls. The first issue is 
that many factors that affect the electorate’s preferences for inflation such as 
wages, employment status or assets are partly endogenous to inflation rates.6 
The second issue is to find a characteristic of the electorate that can be reliably 
linked to inflation preferences both theoretically and empirically. 
 
To address both pitfalls, I choose to focus on the share of the elderly – those 
above 65 years old - that is present in a country in a given year. The elderly 
are clearly inflation averse7 and the share of the elderly in a country is not 
determined by the inflation rate. In other words, the share of elderly is a good 
first case to investigate the impact of electoral preferences on inflation rates: it 
is highly correlated to factors that can be expected to influence inflation 
preferences but is not itself determined by inflation rates. The presence of the 
elderly in OECD countries8  has also varied greatly over time and across 
countries. In 1960, less than 10% of the population in most OECD countries 
were above 65%. By 2010, all OECD countries had more than 10% elderly and 
most of the OECD this was higher than 15%, while in Germany and Japan the 
elderly amounted to 20% of their population. 
 
I argue that the demographic profile of countries has important consequences 
for economic outcomes as governments must increasingly take into account 
the economic policy preferences of the elderly. I make this claim in the case of 
inflation rates across developed economies and show that countries with 
more elderly exhibit lower inflation because old people are both more 
inflation averse and politically powerful. My argument enfolds in three steps. 
                                                        
6 For instance, if one looked at the unemployed as a case of a group that is not particularly 
inflation averse, and unemployment has some relationship to inflation, then our independent 
variable would be endogenous to our dependent variable. 
7 Scheeve 2004. 
8 I refer to the following 21 OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Japan, New Zealand, Netherlands, 
Norway, United Kingdom, United States. 
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First, I argue that pensioners are more indifferent to unemployment than the 
rest of the population but are concerned about the value of their savings and 
pensions. As a result they are likely to oppose inflation much more than 
members of the labour force whose livelihood depends first and foremost on 
their employment prospects and are therefore more concerned about 
unemployment than inflation. I also document the political strength of the 
elderly in all developed countries. While important, this first step builds 
mostly on existing literature and is therefore not particularly controversial.  
 
In the second and third steps, I discuss the macroeconomic implications of 
having inflation averse and politically powerful elderly population. I verify 
empirically the full causal chain of my argument. I start by arguing that 
political parties are influenced by the share of elderly in their electorate. 
Using panel data regression analysis of party manifesto data, I find that 
political parties in countries with a larger share of elderly have more 
economically orthodox manifestos. The third step is a logical implication of 
the first two: countries with more elderly should ceteris paribus exhibit lower 
inflation rates. The underlying mechanism is straightforward: a larger share 
of elderly in an economy makes them a more powerful constituency whose 
preferences for low inflation are more likely to be taken into account by both 
conservative and social democratic parties, which in turn push for low 
inflation when in power. I test this final step using a battery of panel data 
regression analyses on a sample of 21 OECD countries since the 1960s. These 
results hold using a wide variety of specifications and estimation methods. 
Using an Error Correction Model, I also analyse the long run dynamics of 
adjustment in inflation rates in response to a larger share of elderly. Using a 
structural equation model, I show that the share of the elderly has both a 
direct effect on inflation and an indirect effect by being correlated to higher 
central bank independence. As a robustness check, I extend my analysis to the 
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world by running a regression analysis on a much larger sample for 175 
countries for which data is available.  
 
While focused on the impact of a key independent variable on inflation, my 
findings advance our understanding of both inflation and ageing. First, they 
suggest that as countries age, achieving low inflation becomes an increasingly 
strong political imperative, regardless of what may be economically desirable. 
Second, if ageing has an important effect on such a crucial economic outcome, 
this opens up the question of the impact of ageing on other economic policies 
and outcomes. Third, this paper has focused on the role of demographic 
politics but further research should extend the analysis to other important 
facets of electoral politics that affect inflation. 
 
The rest of the paper enfolds as follows. The next section reviews previous 
literature and maps the recent cross-national variation in inflation rates. Next, 
I present my argument concerning the impact of the elderly on inflation. I 
argue the elderly are both politically powerful and inflation averse, and show 
that political parties in countries with more elderly are more economically 
orthodox. The third section then tests the expectations of my model 
concerning the relationship between the share of elderly and inflation rates. 
The last section concludes with some implications for further research. 
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The political economy determinants of inflation rates  
 
The conventional wisdom: ideas and institutions 
 
Two main approaches in comparative political economy have sought to 
explain inflation rates in developed economies - both ignoring electoral 
politics. The first approach has focused on the role of ideas. In this approach, 
a new dominant economic narrative, new classical economics9 - and within it 
monetarism10 - convinced policy makers that any monetary induced short 
term employment gains fade away over the long run while resulting in higher 
inflation. This in turn made low inflation policies more appealing to 
government officials 11  and resulted in a shift away from the Keynesian 
consensus that had prevailed in the post war era until then.12 
 
However, this shift in the prevailing ideas concerning the optimal inflation 
rate also created a dilemma, namely how to achieve this lower inflation target 
in a context where policy makers may be tempted, for electoral gains, to 
pursue short term goals13 that may raise inflation? This created a particularly 
acute problem for the left which was seeking ways to lower the interest rate 
premia they were charged when in power. 14  Various solutions were 
proposed, for instance tying future governments’ hands, 15  or trying to 
convince the electorate that governments have no alternatives but to an 
pursue unpopular monetary policy.16 One solution to the time inconsistency 
                                                        
9 Soskice and Iversen 2006. 
10 Alt and Chrystal 1983; Friedman 1968. 
11 E.g. Mc. Namara 1998. 
12 Hall 1986. 
13 Alesina et al. 1997; Nordhaus 1975; McRae 1977. 
14 Garrett 1998; Goodhart 1997; Capie et al. 1994. 
15 Goodman 1991; Clark 1998. 
16 Etzel 1990; Woolley 1984; Bernhard 1996. 
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problem that gained prominence was to fully delegate monetary policy to 
independent central banks thereby convincing all actors that the commitment 
to low inflation was credible.17 Joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) 
and delegating monetary policy to the European Central Bank raised the 
political costs of inflation because governments’ low inflation commitments 
would be closely monitored by private sector agents.18 As a result, agents 
would expect low inflation and this in turn becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy 
even in the absence of a monetary policy tightening.19 The problem with the 
ideational approach is what it leaves unanswered, namely whose ideas 
dominate policy making and why?20 In addition, most of this literature has 
been concerned with explaining the shift to a low inflation regime over time, 
making it difficult to use ideas to explain the cross-national variation in 
inflation rates we observe. 
 
A second stream of literature emphasises the role of domestic institutions. It 
emphasises in particular the role of independent central banks21 which are 
themselves seen as institutionalising the ideational consensus discussed 
above. Because central banks were seen as more conservatives - in the sense 
that they prefer lower inflation than elected governments – and less receptive 
to electoral pressures, independence should lead to lower inflation22 as well 
as lower partisan and electoral political cycles in inflation rates.23  
 
However, the effect of independent central banks on inflation may depend on 
                                                        
17 Barro and Gordon, 1983; Barro and Gordon, 1983b; Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Alesina; 1989. 
18 Giavazzi and Pagano 1988. 
19 Grilli et al. 1991. 
20 Mc. Namara (1998) does discuss what made the new paradigm attractive: a combination of 
policy failure (in dealing with oil shock), policy innovation (monetarism) and policy emulation 
(seeing Germany as an example of good policy). Here I do not wish to suggest that these are 
irrelevant, rather that this must be completed by an analysis of electoral constraints. 
21 Cuckierman 1992; Eijffinger and de Haan 1996; Debelle and Fischer 1994; Cuckierman, Webb 
and Neyapti 1991; Bade and Parkin 1984. 
22 Roggoff 1985.  
23 Franzese 2003; Clark 2003; Way 2000. 
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other institutions. There is for instance some evidence that the effect of central 
bank independence may also be contingent on whether governments are 
weak. 24  But more important than the structure of governments is the 
institutional environment in which employees and employers bargain wages. 
A significant literature has stressed the importance of wage bargaining 
institutions and unions. 25  For instance, in the Keynesian era, unions 
moderated their wages in exchange for long term gains26. In countries with 
neocorporatist institutions,27 unions had greater incentives to exercise wage 
restraint because governments were offering them various benefits in return, 
thereby minimising both inflation and unemployment if wage moderation 
was coupled with the right fiscal and monetary policies.28  
 
These two approaches are not mutually exclusive. It is in principle possible 
that both institutions and ideas jointly determine inflation rates. For instance, 
the effect of having an independent central bank on inflation rates fell as 
policy makers increasingly adopted low inflation preferences29. These two 
approaches are valuable in analysing how various institutions and ideas 
affect inflation rates given certain interests in society, but this says very little 
about what these interests are and how they may in turn explain inflation. To 
the extent that this literature focuses on the origins of these institutions, this is 
either to be found in ideas or in the interests of different sectors of the 
economy, where the export sector has a strong interest in retaining 
competitiveness and keeping inflation low. However, when choosing 
institutions governments cannot be assumed to entirely disregard electoral 
constraints, and even when institutions are already given, governments could 
                                                        
24 Sakamoto 2005. 
25 Franzese 1999, 2003; Hall and Franzese 1998; Iversen 1999. 
26 Eichengreen 1997; Iversen and Soskice 2006. 
27 Cameron 1984; Lange and Garrett 1985; Calmfors and Driffill 1988. 
28 Cf. Scharpf 1987. 
29 Kaltenthaler and Anderson 2000. 
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still in principle influence inflation rates through other policies (e.g. fiscal 
policy, welfare state benefits). 
 
Cross-national variation in inflation rates 
 
Ideas cannot easily explain cross-national variation by design, 30  but the 
relationship between central bank and wage bargaining institutions on the 
one hand and inflation on the other hand requires more scrutiny. Figure 1 
shows the cross-national variation in the consumer price index and central 
bank independence in 1998 (i.e. before the European Central Bank took over 
monetary policy responsibility from national central banks in Eurozone 
countries) 31 . It shows that while many soon-to-become members of the 
European Monetary Union had fairly similar degrees of central bank 
independence, several percentage point variation in inflation rates remained 
between low and high inflation performers. Countries with very dissimilar 
central banks exhibited only small differences in inflation rates: pair of 
countries such as Spain and Denmark, Ireland and Norway, or France and 
Japan, had similar inflation rates despite having different degrees of central 
bank independence. The correlation coefficient between inflation and central 
bank independence in a sample of 21 OECD countries since 1960 is negative 
and significant (at the 1% level) but not particularly large (-0.16). 
 
Previous literature discussed earlier would make us expect that wage 
coordination and the size of the export sector may also matter: governments 
in countries with sizeable and well-coordinated export sector have both the 
ability and willingness to keep inflation low to retain their competitive 
                                                        
30 Here I refer to ideas that spread across parties in all countries, but of course it is possible to 
test the impact of partisanship on inflation, which I do in the empirical section. 
31 All the data displayed in this sub-section are discussed in detail in the empirical section of the 
paper and in the appendix. 
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advantage in trade. Figures 2 and 3 display the relationship between inflation 
and wage coordination as well as trade openness as % of GDP, respectively, 
in 1998. Countries ranked as having similar wage coordination have vastly 
different inflation performance (e.g. Japan, Austria, Sweden, Norway and 
Ireland) while countries with similar inflation performance (e.g. Finland and 
the UK, or Japan and France) had different wage coordination indices. The 
correlation coefficient between inflation and wage coordination in a sample of 
21 OECD countries since 1960 is - 0.0187 (non-significant p-value of 0.5435). 
The picture for trade openness is similarly mixed (Figure 3, year 1998): France 
and Australia had lower inflation rates than Ireland and the Netherlands 
despite having much lower levels of trade openness. Belgium and Australia 
had almost identical inflation rates despite having more than 40 percentage 
points differences in their export to GDP ratios. The correlation coefficient 
between inflation and trade openness in a sample of 21 OECD countries since 
1960 is -0.1450 (significant p-value of 0.000).  
 
One could of course object that bivariate correlations can never be perfect 
since there may be ommitted variables, interaction effects, etc. Therefore, here 
I do not wish to suggest that existing explanations can be disproved. Rather I 
make the more modest claim that some of this unexplained variation can be 
explained by a focus on domestic electoral politics. In other words, my 
explanation should be seen as potentially complementary rather than 
substituting for existing explanations.  
 
As I discuss in the next section, I posit that the share of the elderly is 
negatively correlated with inflation because the old are inflation averse, 
politically powerful, and ultimately influence government policies and in turn 
inflation rates. A similar examination of the bivariate relationship between 
inflation rates and the share of elderly in the population reveals a much 
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stronger correlation (Figure 4). The correlation coefficient between inflation 
and the share of elderly in a sample of 21 OECD countries since 1960 is -
0.2797 (significant p-value of 0.000). Thus, on bivariate correlations alone, the 
share of the elderly looks like a reasonable addition to existing explanations. 
In the next section I locate my argument in the literature on the domestic 
politics of inflation and argue that the old are both more inflation averse and 
have sufficient political power to push through their preferences for low 
inflation onto party manifestos.  
 
Figure 1: Consumer price index and central bank independence in 1998 
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Figure 2: Consumer price index and wage coordination in 1998 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Consumer price index and exports as a share of GDP  
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Figure 4: Consumer price indexand population over 65 as a share of total 
population 
 
 
 
Bringing the third ‘i’ back in: Domestic interests and 
demographic change  
 
Domestic electoral politics 
 
In stressing the role of domestic politics, this paper builds on Posen’s 32 
contention that central bank independence may itself be explained by other 
factors which would therefore have causal primacy in explaining inflation 
rates. Specifically, he showed that, because of its preference for low inflation, 
the financial sector has a pivotal role in supporting price stability in the long 
run33. Rather than being a cause of low inflation, central bank independence 
                                                        
32 Posen 1993 and 1995b. 
33 Posen, 1995a. 
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was itself determined by the financial sector’s opposition to inflation. If this is 
true, both low inflation and central bank independence are more likely in 
countries with stronger financial actors,34 whether because of lobbying on the 
parts of financial actors 35  or through the discipline of capital markets. 36 
Cuckierman had in 199237 similarly suggested that the likelihood of making 
central bank independents was a function of the size of financial markets and 
subsequent literature has by and large confirmed Posen’s38 contention that 
central bank independence and low inflation requires political support to be 
sustained in the long run.39 
 
While valuable this latter treatment focuses on interest groups rather than 
electoral dynamics, which had been the focus of older studies in comparative 
political economy. Several decades ago, Hibbs argued that the left and right 
have different inflation-employment preferences because their respective 
constituencies are differently affected by inflation and unemployment. 40 
These earlier studies by Hibbs therefore suggested that domestic politics 
cannot be ignored. However, even these treatments fail to consider changes in 
the electoral composition that affect both left and right, in which case the 
effect would not necessarily operate via left-right differences in government 
policies. For instance, there is some evidence that past trauma with 
hyperinflation played an important role in Germany’s decision to delegate 
monetary policy to the Bundesbank.41 Over the long run, changes in the 
electorate’s preferences may be more important than differences between 
distinct parts of the electorate at one point in time. 
                                                        
34 Posen 1993. 
35 Posen 1995b. 
36 Maxfield 1997. Note that I test the effect of both capital market openness and the size of the 
stock market in the empirical section of the paper. 
37 Cuckierman 1992. 
38 Posen 1993, 1995. 
39 Berger, Eijffinger and De Haan 2001; Hayo 1998; Kuttner and Posen 2009; and Miller 1998. 
40 E.g. Hibbs 1977 and 1986. 
41 Issing 1993, pp 18. 
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Rather than focusing on partisan differences or events in the past that affect 
the whole electorate, I focus here on how different groups in the population 
may have distinct inflation preferences and how the size of these groups may 
in turn feed into differences in inflation rates across countries. That inflation 
has distributional consequences is not controversial 42  and this occurs 
regardless of the degree of central bank independence.43 As discussed in the 
introduction, one difficulty in estimating the effect of the electorate’s 
preferences on inflation is that inflation itself may affect the characteristics of 
the electorate that shape their preferences. It is therefore crucial to use a 
criterion for identifying inflation averse groups that is as much as possible 
exogenous to inflation. One such criterion is age. The old that have retired 
should care less (or not at all) about their employment prospect, since they 
derive their income from pensions and/or assets – rather than employment, 
and are often net creditors, having repaid debts accumulated through 
mortgages.44 By contrast, the young and/or those in the labour force tend to 
care more about employment than inflation given that most of their income 
depends on working and that they are often net debtors.45 
 
The elderly, inflation preferences and political power 
 
What is the evidence concerning older people’s inflation preferences? In a 
recent study, Scheeve analysed public inflation aversion and found that older 
individuals are more inflation averse because they “are more likely to have 
significant nominal assets and/or to rely on fixed incomes”.46 Using both 
                                                        
42 Briault 1995; Fischer 1994; Laidler 1997. 
43 Posen 1995b; Walsh 1994. 
44 Note that throughout the discussion about elderly’s preferences is relative: what matters is 
their inflation preferences relative to the rest of the population, and similarly for their position in 
terms of income sources, asset wealth, etc. 
45 cf. Bach and Stephenson 1974. 
46 Scheeve 2004, pp 11. 
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Eurobarometer and International Social Survey Program data, results from a 
logit regression show that older respondents are indeed more inflation averse 
and this holds when controlling for labour market status, ideology, education, 
income quartile and including country effects.47 Note that consistent with 
previous explanations focusing on the financial sector, those employed in that 
sector are more inflation averse and country level trade openness increases 
the likelihood of respondents being inflation averse48. He concluded that “this 
article provides substantial evidence that there is sufficient variation in public 
macroeconomic priorities across countries for the specification of preferences 
to be significantly improved by accounting for the relative inflation aversion 
of citizens”.49 
 
These results are compelling, but it is worth testing my assumption 
concerning the elderly’s inflation preferences again briefly here for illustrative 
purposes. To do so, I rely on the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File 
covering the period 1970 to 200250 and including the following countries: 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. My dependent variable is coded 1 if respondents identify 
inflation as their first or second priority. My analysis controls for the gender 
and educational level of the respondent and I include robust standard errors 
clustered by country as well as country and year dummies to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity. To test my assumption, I rely on a variable 
capturing the age of the respondent and as an alternative a binary variable 
capturing whether the respondent is retired. 
 
                                                        
47 Scheeve 2004, pp 17, 18. 
48 Scheeve 2004, pp 19. 
49 Scheeve 2004, pp 29. 
50 Data Set Edition v2.0.1, Schmitt and Scholz 2005. 
The impact of the elderly on inflation rates in developed countries 
 
 
16 
The results from a logit analysis are shown in table 1. In line with Scheeve’s 
results, column 1 suggests that retired respondents are more likely to choose 
inflation as their first or second priority. Female respondent are more likely to 
be inflation averse while education makes respondents less inflation averse. 
Column 2 shows that the older the respondent the more inflation averse their 
preferences. In column 3, I control for the country specific income group in 
which the respondent is located (not shown here but suggests higher income 
respondents are less inflation averse): the results for age are less strong but 
still significant. In column 4, I also control for left-right self-placement (more 
right wing respondents are more inflation averse) and union membership 
(union members are less inflation averse) and being retired still makes you 
more inflation averse. My findings here are not meant to be an exhaustive test 
of inflation preferences since they essentially re-affirm what is already shown 
in Scheeve’s more systematic study of this topic. 
 
Why does this difference in inflation preference matter? Developed 
economies have experienced a significant ageing of their population.51 How 
to define the old is not a straightforward matter: Goerres discusses the pros 
and cons of different approaches and sets the cut-off point at 60 years old, 
arguing that this is the median age of retirement.52 This is a sensible cut off 
point for his purposes, since the EU average exit age from the labour force 
was 61.5 years old in 2010,53 but for the purpose of minimizing the risk of 
capturing people who are not yet retired in our measure of inflation averse 
old people, it is safer to put the cut-off point at 65.54 Using this cut-off point, 
almost 20% of the population in the Euro area was above 65, and 5% above 80. 
                                                        
51 Tepe and Vanhuysse 2009; Lynch and Myrskylä 2009, Sinn and Uebelmesser 2002. 
52 Goerres 2009, pp 1-10. 
53 European Commission 2014, pp 51. 
54 Of course, one could directly use the share of the retired but this choice entails two problems. 
First, there is no readily available data since the 1960s for 21 OECD countries – to my knowledge. 
Second, the share of the population that is retired is much of government policies.  
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The old age dependency ratio (share of 65+ over those between 15 and 64) 
increased from 12.5% in 1950 to 23.8% in 2010,55 while the numbers for Africa 
range from 5.9 to 6.1%, for Asia from 6.8% to 9.9%, and for Latin America 
from 6.2% to 10.6%. By 2050, the share over 65 will reach almost 30% in the 
European Union, with more than 10% above 80 years old.56  
 
The old are not only increasing in number, they are also a group with 
considerable political power.57 Indeed, older people in Europe are more likely 
to vote58 and are much more likely to be members of political parties.59 The 
60-69 age group is more likely to be union members than every over age 
group except 50 to 59 years old.60 If older people are more inflation averse 
and are politically powerful, it follows that their electoral power increases 
ceteris paribus with their numbers. As a result, political parties can be expected 
to be more anti-inflationary in countries with a larger share of elderly, and the 
governing party consequently pursues less inflationary policies in such 
countries. If this is correct, countries with a larger share of elderly population 
should exhibit lower inflation rates. This prediction can be tested because 
there is important cross-national variation in the share of over 65: for instance 
in 2013, the share over 65 in Europe varied from 21% in Germany to 12% in 
Ireland.61 In the world the variation is even stronger: from 3% in Kuwait to 
25.5% in Japan.62 
 
To clarify, my argument is not that the share of elderly is the only factor that 
matters, nor that it is necessarily the most important factor (though this is 
                                                        
55 European Commission 2014, pp 23. 
56 European Commission 2014, pp 410. 
57 E.g. Goeres 2009; Sinn and Uebelmesser 2002. 
58 Goerres 2007. 
59 Goerres 2009, see chapter 5. 
60 Goerres, 2009, see table 5.1. 
61 European Commission 2014, pp 21. 
62 United Nations database 2004, cited in Goerres 2009. 
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certainly possible and ultimately an empirical matter). Rather, this paper 
makes the more modest claim that the share of the elderly is a strong 
determinant of inflation rates alongside other institutional (e.g. central bank 
independence) and economic (e.g. trade openness) factors.  
 
Table 1: The determinants of inflation aversion 
 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Retired 
respondent 
0.16***   0.19*** 
 (0.041)   (0.054) 
Age  0.01*** 0.004**  
  (0.001) (0.001)  
Female 
respondent 
0.22*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.17*** 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Education -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.12*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
Union member    -0.04** 
    (0.014) 
Left-Right     0.02** 
(higher values 
more right) 
   (0.005) 
Constant 1.24*** 1.52*** 1.55*** 0.46*** 
 (0.084) (0.123) (0.134) (0.075) 
Country fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 450,412 461,431 353,925 156,684 
Pseudo R-
squared 
0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 
Note; robust standard errors clustered by country shown in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** 
p<0.01, * p<0.05. Country and time effects included but not shown. Column 3 also 
controls for income placement of the respondent (not shown: high income respondents 
are more inflation averse). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tim Vlandas 
        
19 
Grey power and political parties’ manifestos 
 
To test whether this is indeed the case, I proceed in three steps. First, in the 
remainder of this section, I show that parties are more inflation averse in 
countries with more elderly. Unfortunately there is to my knowledge no 
direct measure of anti-inflation preferences of all political parties in OECD 
countries. But the party manifesto dataset project63 which codes all party 
manifestos along several dimensions since the 1950s, has a variable that 
comes close called ‘Economic Orthodoxy’ (per414). This variable captures 
whether the party manifesto refers to “support for a strong currency”. It also 
captures factors that likely have an effect on inflation such as “reduction of 
budget deficits”, and “thrift and savings in the face of economic hardship”. 
Higher values mean that there are more references to economic orthodoxy in 
a given manifesto in a country’s election. 
 
My dependent variable captures the average across all political parties’ 
manifestos since my argument is about how a large group of voters that are 
opposed to inflation forces political parties to shift their policy preferences 
towards inflation. Because elections take place at different points in time 
depending on the country under consideration and since an immediate effect 
is implausible, I compute decade averages since the 1960s for 21 OECD 
countries. The results controlling for country fixed effects and time effects, as 
well as a number of factors 64  that may plausibly affect manifestos are 
presented in table 2. Note that this is not meant to be an exhaustive analysis of 
the determinants of party manifestos but merely to substantiate a link 
between the share of elderly and economic orthodoxy. The results are broadly 
consistent with this claim: countries with more elderly as a percentage of their 
                                                        
63 Volkens et al. 2014. 
64 See next section for definitions and sources. 
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total population exhibit more economically orthodox political parties, when 
controlling for existing levels of inflation, deficits, unemployment, trade 
openness, trade union density and left presence in the cabinet. 
 
Table 2: The share of elderly and economic orthodoxy in party manifesto 
 
Columns (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Share of elderly 0.18* 0.19* 0.19* 0.18* 0.17* 
 (0.068) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.066) 
Inflation  -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 
  (0.085) (0.088) (0.094) (0.087) 
Trade openness  0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(% of GDP)  (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
Unemployment rate   -0.001 -0.01 -0.03 
   (0.061) (0.062) (0.067) 
Deficit   0.04 0.03 0.03 
   (0.077) (0.076) (0.077) 
Union density    0.01 0.01 
    (0.014) (0.014) 
Left control     0.01 
(% cabinet)     (0.006) 
1970s period dummy -0.19 -0.09 0.50 0.55 0.52 
 (0.543) (0.762) (0.859) (0.867) (0.821) 
1980s period dummy 0.21 0.08 0.58 0.66 0.67 
 (0.460) (0.747) (0.965) (0.959) (0.920) 
1990s period dummy -0.78 -1.20* -0.96 -0.87 -0.92 
 (0.462) (0.523) (0.769) (0.783) (0.725) 
2000s period dummy -1.66** -2.35** -2.12* -2.00* -2.09** 
 (0.532) (0.675) (0.872) (0.867) (0.695) 
Constant 0.68 0.02 0.02 -0.16 -0.41 
 (0.686) (1.292) (1.405) (1.423) (1.188) 
Observations 102 102 94 94 94 
R-squared 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.21 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared overall model 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 
Note: OLS with robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. The 
results are the same if a tobit regression is used. 
 
 
Now that I have established that (1) older people are more inflation averse 
and (2) countries with more old people have more economically orthodox 
political parties, two steps – which I investigate in the next section – remain. 
First, I need to demonstrate that the share of elderly is associated with lower 
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inflation. I do so for a sample of 21 OECD countries. But OECD countries 
experienced ageing conjointly with other structural shifts in the economy 
which may be hard to fully net out using statistical methods. Focusing on 
OECD countries over a long period of time means most of the observations 
capture over time rather than cross-national variation. I therefore carry out 
regression analysis on a larger sample of all countries in the world for which 
data is available. This raises other issues of comparability between countries 
but ensures that the old are not spuriously related to inflation because of 
unobservable broader structural shifts that affected the OECD 
simultaneously. Both samples have strengths and shortcomings, so testing my 
argument on both represents a strong test. 
 
Second, to further substantiate the causal mechanism, I show that the share of 
elderly is related to key economic policies (central bank independence, lower 
non-elderly related deficits, larger spending on old age) that affect inflation in 
the OECD. While this illustrates some channels through which the share of 
elderly affect inflation, this cannot rule out a direct effect of the elderly; for 
instance if they have distinct consumption patterns that generate economic 
effects on inflation. To investigate this latter alternative mechanism, I also test 
whether the share of elderly affects inflation in both democratic and non-
democratic countries: if it does, then the electoral mechanism can be shown to 
co-exist with other mechanisms, but if it does not, we can conclude that 
having a larger share of elderly only leads to lower inflation in democratic 
countries where they can express their preferences in the electoral arena. 
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Empirical tests of the determinants of inflation 
Data 
To test my argument I collect data for 21 OECD countries in the period 
between 1960 and 2012 in the first instance. I test my argument both on this 
sample and on a smaller sample that ends in 2000 when controlling for central 
bank independence, since the common monetary policy of the ECB may 
introduce polarising inflation dynamics.65 This time period allows me to test 
the determinants of cross-national variation in inflation both in the relatively 
low inflation period of post-war Europe, the high inflation episodes of the 
1970s and the –very - low inflation thereafter. I initially focus on developed 
economies because they have more established democracies, more 
comparable economic structures and development levels.66  
 
My dependent variable is the overall consumer price inflation which is most 
directly relevant for people’s purchasing power, while my key independent 
variable is the share of the population that is over 65. The latter measure of 
old people represents a conservative estimate of the power of the old, in the 
sense that it is more likely to exclude people in retirement than to include 
them. This seems more desirable than the reverse problem, namely including 
people who are still working.  
 
All my independent variables are described in the appendix (see table A1), 
but two particularly important controls are Central Bank Independence (CBI) 
                                                        
65 By removing the sanction that national central banks could impose on the sheltered sector, the 
European monetary union leads to polarisation between sheltered and non-sheltered sectors. 
Cross-national variation in inflation rates may also be affected by these polarising dynamics since 
countries without coordinated wage bargaining will experience greater inflationary pressures in 
the absence of a national central bank that can punish deviations. See Hancke 2013 and Johnston 
2012 for more on this. 
66 Note also that it is already well known that central bank independence is not associated with 
inflation in developing economies. See Cukierman et al. 1992. 
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and wage coordination. CBI can be expected to lead to lower inflation because 
politically motivated central banks (or government monetary policy) will not 
be credible in their promises not to influence electoral outcomes through 
opportunistic monetary policy. Many indices exist,67 but I choose to use the 
Cuckierman index68 partly because it is widely used and partly because the 
update by Polillo and Guillén has the best coverage for my time period.69 
Note however that this index does not capture the ECB’s monetary stance and 
therefore limits my sample to pre-EMU times. 70  Wage coordination is 
important in its own right as it allows unions to internalise the effects of their 
wage claims – which could otherwise lead to inflation. It is also important in 
shaping the effectiveness of CBI: when faced with a conservative central bank, 
coordinated unions will internalise the response function of the central bank 
thereby leading to low inflation without the central bank having to raise 
interest rates.71 I choose the wage coordination index provided by Visser 
which takes values between 1 (low coordination) and 5 (high coordination).72 
 
Moreover, my baseline model controls for various economic and structural 
factors: GDP growth, the unemployment rate which may put downward 
pressure on inflation through its effect on wages, the degree of trade openness 
which makes inflation more costly, and the degree of deindustrialisation. I 
also control for political factors such as union density, which can be expected 
to lead to higher inflation by increasing the power of workers or to lower 
inflation if the olsonian effect where unions internalize the impact of their 
                                                        
67 Alesina 1989; Bade and Parkin 1978; Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 1992; Eijffinger and 
Schaling 1993; Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini 1991. 
68 Cuckierman 1992. 
69 Polillo and Guillén 2005. 
70 This is perhaps for the better since –as already discussed - the ECB’s policy may have different 
effects in distinct countries and some authors have argued that unlike national central banks the 
ECB no longer represents a credible threat to punish excessive wage agreements. See Hancke 
2013, Johnston 2012. 
71 See the following for a discussion of wage coordination: Franzese 1999, 2003; Hall and 
Franzese 1998; Iversen 1999. 
72 Visser 2013. 
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wage claims dominates. My measure of left control of the government should 
be associated with higher inflation. Finally, I test the effect of social 
expenditures and deficits. Various other factors are introduced as robustness 
checks and discussed with the results. 
 
Estimation strategy and results 
 
I include robust standard errors clustered by country to address the panel 
structure of my data and neutralise the biases that auto-correlation and 
heteroskedasticity would have on standard errors. The results for various 
models are shown in table 3. In columns 1 to 3, I include the share of the 
elderly with and without time and country effects. The coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant as expected: countries with a higher share of 
elderly exhibit lower levels of inflation. Next, two key economic controls are 
included; unemployment and real GDP growth again with and without 
country and time effects (columns 4 to 6). In columns 7 to 10, I include 
deficits, trade openness, and the share of the labour force in industry. The 
share of elderly remains negatively associated with inflation, real GDP 
growth is also negatively associated with inflation, while unemployment and 
openness have no statistically significant effect. Columns 11 to 19 include the 
left control of the government (no effect73), union density (positive effect), 
spending on social security (no effect), central bank independence (negative 
effect) and the wage coordination index (no effect). 74  In column 18, all 
independent variables are normalised so as to simplify interpretation of 
magnitude: a 1 standard deviation change in the share of the elderly has a 
                                                        
73 By no effect I mean that the effect is not statistically significant, by positive I mean the 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant and by negative that it is negative and 
statistically significant. 
74 Note that there are more columns that new variables because some columns show the effect 
with and without country fixed effects for robustness. 
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much greater impact on inflation than either central bank independence or 
wage coordination. Throughout the effect of the share of elderly on inflation 
stays stable, negative, and statistically significant.  
 
One could argue at this stage that this correlation might nevertheless be 
spurious for two reasons. One reason is that the correlation between the share 
of the old and inflation might be driven by the concomitance of high inflation 
and low share of elderly in 1970s and low inflation and high share of elderly 
in 2000s. But if this is was the case, restricting sample to post-1980 or post-
1990 periods would result in a non-significant impact of elderly on inflation. 
Yet, statistical significance remains for the coefficient of elderly when 
restricting the analysis to more recent periods (see table A4 in appendix). 
 
The other reason the correlation might be spurious is because the share of the 
elderly does not itself affect inflation, but instead influences policies that 
affect inflation. The previous section’s analysis of party manifesto data partly 
addresses this issue, but it may be that both inflation and the share of elderly 
are trending upwards and that the share of elderly has in fact no effect on any 
factors that may in turn determine inflation. The Fisher's test rejects the null 
hypothesis that all panel series are non-stationary for inflation but does not 
reject the null hypothesis for the share of elderly. Spurious relationships 
between two variables arising from co-integration is unlikely to occur when 
only one of the two variables is non-stationary, but I nevertheless test the 
effect of the elderly on the first difference in inflation in columns (1) and (2) in 
table 4 on a model that includes a lagged dependent variable to neutralise the 
effect of the level of inflation prior to its change. Columns (1) and (2) show 
that a higher share of elderly (3 years moving average since the effect cannot 
be expected to occur instantaneously, not lagged in column 1 and lagged in 
column 2) are negatively associated with the first difference in inflation. In 
The impact of the elderly on inflation rates in developed countries 
 
 
26 
columns 3 to 6, I turn my attention to the effect of elderly on other dependent 
variables that may themselves affect inflation: column (3) shows that the 
share of elderly is positively associated with the level of CBI75, column (4) that 
countries with more elderly spend more on old age, and column (5) that the 
share of elderly is negatively associated with higher non-old76 related deficits. 
Note that all independent variables are normalised so as to simplify 
interpretation of magnitude: this shows that a 1 standard deviation change in 
the share of the elderly has a much greater impact on central bank 
independence than other independent variables.  
 
Though my estimation strategy is unlikely to be biased, I rerun my model 
using several alternative estimation methods in table 5: a generalized linear 
models that allows me to specify the within-group correlation structure for 
the panels, 77  a feasible generalized least squares, 78  and a panel-corrected 
standard error model79. The results concerning the share of the elderly are 
unchanged. Next, I turn my attention to the likelihood of having particularly 
high inflation by running a binary logistic model with robust clustered 
standard errors on a dependent variable that takes value 1 if inflation is high 
(defined here as being above 10%) and 0 otherwise. Having a large share of 
elderly significantly reduces the probability of having a high inflation 
episode, consistent with the notion that high inflation incurs too high an 
electoral penalty in countries with large shares of elderly. 
 
                                                        
75 In table A5 in the appendix, I run an analysis of the determinants of CBI with and without time 
and country effects, and also run a logistic model where the dependent variable takes value 1 if 
there was an increase in CBI and 0 otherwise. The results suggest the share of elderly are 
positively associated with higher CBI and makes an increase in CBI index more likely. 
76 I.e. when ‘neutralising’ the effect of spending on old age by substracting spending on old age 
from deficits which creates a deficit variable that is not driven by spending on old age. 
77 Using the xtgee in stata and specifying a Gaussian family, an identity link and an autoregressive 
(ar1) error process. 
78 Using the xtgls command in stata. 
79 Using the xtpcse command in stata and specifying an ar1 process. 
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In table 6, I test my argument in years where elections were held (column 1) 
and where they were not (column 2). It is plausible that being a member of 
the EMU has an effect of inflation so I include a non-EMU dummy in column 
(3) that takes value 0 if the country is a member of the Eurozone and 1 if it is 
not a member of the Eurozone. Being outside EMU is not statistically 
significant. Employment protection legislation and bargaining coverage both 
have a positive associations with inflation (columns 4 and 5), while union 
authority and union concentration have no effect (columns 6 and 7). The 
influential literature on Varieties of Capitalism suggests there may be 
systematic differences between Liberal Market Economies and Coordinated 
Market Economies in terms of economic outcomes.80 I therefore include an 
LME dummy in column 8 which is not statistically significant. I also check 
whether including the size of the stock market (column 9) makes a difference. 
As expected, the size of stock markets as % of GDP is negatively correlated 
with inflation. Throughout my key results concerning the effect of the elderly 
share on inflation remains. 
 
Moreover, I carry out additional robustness checks which for reasons of space 
are shown in the appendix (table A3). In column 1, I include a lagged 
dependent variable in the baseline model discussed earlier (which is positive 
and statistically significant). In columns 2 and 3, I check that lagging all 
independent variables (with and without country fixed effects, respectively) 
does not change the sign or statistical significance of the coefficient for the 
share of elderly. In columns 4 to 13, I check the robustness of my results for 
several additional independent variables (with and without fixed effects for 
each independent variable). Capital openness (columns 4 and 5) is negative 
and significant suggesting that capital mobility lowers inflation rates. 
Structural unemployment has no effect (columns 6 and 7), the share of home 
                                                        
80 Hall and Soskice 2001. 
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ownership is positive and significant only when no fixed effects are included 
(columns 8 and 9), and the share of employment in the industry (columns 10 
and 11) has no statistically significant effect on inflation. In columns 12 and 
13, I test the effect of including a longer time series of employment protection 
legislation (EPL) developed by Allard (2005).81 The results suggest that higher 
EPL only has a positive statistically significant effect when country fixed 
effects are not included. Throughout, the effect of the share of the elderly on 
inflation is negative and statistically significant. 
 
Finally, the analysis so far has documented a link between the share of elderly 
and party manifestos, between the share of elderly and central bank 
independence, and between the share of elderly and inflation, but not 
between party manifestos and central bank independence. This is addressed 
in table A6 in the appendix: I run several regressions on decade’s averages for 
21 OECD from 1960s to 2000s (ie there are 5 time periods) that show the share 
of elderly are positively associated with economic orthodoxy of party 
manifestos (column 1), while the share of elderly and economic orthodoxy 
(both lagged one period) are positively associated with higher central bank 
independence (column 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
81 Note I had already tested the effect of the EPL index developed by the OECD that was only 
available from 1985 onwards. 
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Table 3: The determinants of cross-national variation in inflation levels 
 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent 
variable 
Level of Consumer Price Inflation 
Elderly -0.56*** -0.26* -0.27* -0.78*** -0.33** -0.80*** -0.82*** -0.85*** -0.57** -0.57* 
 (0.059) (0.112) (0.119) (0.105) (0.119) (0.113) (0.148) (0.168) (0.196) (0.249) 
Real GDP 
growth 
   -0.51*** -0.28** -0.53*** -0.45*** -0.48** -0.49*** -0.50*** 
    (0.106) (0.104) (0.110) (0.126) (0.132) (0.107) (0.115) 
Unemployment 
rate 
   -0.14 -0.21* -0.16 -0.22** -0.24* -0.08 -0.10 
    (0.080) (0.105) (0.088) (0.083) (0.090) (0.069) (0.073) 
Deficit       -0.18*** -0.18** -0.16** -0.16* 
       (0.054) (0.055) (0.060) (0.061) 
Trade 
openness 
        0.02 0.04 
         (0.027) (0.049) 
Industrial 
employment 
        32.55*** 35.98*** 
         (6.914) (9.263) 
Constant 12.53*** 4.39*** 4.47*** 17.88*** 7.56*** 18.34*** 18.85*** 19.57*** 3.50 1.70 
 (0.944) (1.086) (1.130) (1.671) (1.502) (1.382) (2.293) (2.144) (3.100) (4.851) 
Observations 1,110 1,110 1,110 1,092 1,092 1,092 981 981 959 959 
Number of 
countries 
21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Country Fixed 
effects 
No No Yes No No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year effects No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No No 
R-squared 
within model 
0.11 0.65 0.65 0.21 0.67 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.35 0.35 
R-squared 
overall model 
0.08 0.56 0.56 0.12 0.53 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.20 0.18 
R-squared 
between model 
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. 
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Table 3(continued): The determinants of cross-national variation in inflation 
levels 
 
Column (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
Dependent 
variable 
Level of Consumer Price Inflation 
 
Elderly -0.61** -0.61* -0.62*** -0.60*** -0.63** 
 (0.204) (0.243) (0.173) (0.170) (0.210) 
Real GDP growth -0.46*** -0.47*** -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.44*** 
 (0.100) (0.106) (0.084) (0.090) (0.092) 
Unemployment 
rate 
-0.11 -0.13 -0.23** -0.22* -0.33* 
 (0.079) (0.086) (0.071) (0.108) (0.120) 
Deficit -0.17** -0.17* -0.18*** -0.19** -0.17** 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.054) (0.057) (0.059) 
Trade openness 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 
 (0.030) (0.047) (0.023) (0.025) (0.034) 
Industry 30.65*** 32.57** 16.41* 16.30* 12.93 
 (6.900) (8.716) (6.998) (6.996) (8.122) 
Left government 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Union density   0.13** 0.14** 0.19** 
   (0.045) (0.046) (0.061) 
Social security    -0.05 -0.02 
    (0.185) (0.217) 
Constant 4.56 3.53 4.88 4.89 3.00 
 (3.571) (4.869) (3.828) (3.819) (4.622) 
Observations 939 939 917 917 917 
Number of 
countries 
21 21 21 21 21 
Country fixed 
effects 
No Yes No No Yes 
Year effects No No No No No 
R-squared within  0.35 0.35 0.44 0.44 0.45 
R-squared overall 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.11 
R-squared btw   0.06 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05;  
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Table 3 (continued): The determinants of cross-national variation in inflation 
levels 
 
Column (16) (17) (18) 
Dependent variable Level of Consumer Price Inflation 
Elderly -0.60* -0.59* -1.80* 
 (0.269) (0.270) (0.815) 
Real GDP growth -0.70*** -0.69*** -1.92*** 
 (0.068) (0.070) (0.196) 
Unemployment rate -0.41*** -0.41*** -1.65*** 
 (0.109) (0.112) (0.452) 
Deficit -0.31*** -0.32*** -1.13*** 
 (0.089) (0.093) (0.328) 
Trade openness 0.10*** 0.09*** 2.80*** 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.740) 
Industry 9.59 8.35 0.60 
 (8.105) (7.699) (0.550) 
Left government 0.01* 0.01* 0.33* 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.149) 
Union density 0.17*** 0.16*** 3.24*** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.934) 
Social security -0.19 -0.19 -0.76 
 (0.205) (0.203) (0.825) 
CBI -4.33** -4.38** -0.83** 
 (1.443) (1.438) (0.273) 
Coordination index  0.21 0.28 
  (0.206) (0.280) 
Constant 7.20 7.31 6.56*** 
 (5.308) (5.117) (1.219) 
Observations 699 699 699 
Number of 
countries 
21 21 21 
Country fixed 
effects 
No No No 
Year effects No No No 
R-squared within  0.52 0.53 0.53 
R-squared overall 0.10 0.09 0.09 
R-squared btw   0.03 0.03 0.03 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05; Column 18 shows the results when all independent variables are rescaled to have 
mean 0 and standard deviation of 1 (i.e normalised).  
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Table 4: Alternative dependent variables 
 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable Inflation 
(first difference) 
CBI Spending 
on old age 
Deficit-minus 
Spending on 
old age 
Independent variable 
standardised 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Inflation -0.14*** -0.14***    
(lagged) (0.030) (0.031)    
Elderly -0.06 t  0.12** 1.36*** -2.06t 
(3 years moving average) (0.031)  (0.036) (0.205) (1.131) 
Elderly  -0.07*    
(3 years moving average, 
lagged once) 
 (0.032)    
Real GDP 0.02 0.02 0.004 -0.03 1.11* 
 (0.050) (0.052) (0.004) (0.082) (0.404) 
Unemployment rate -0.08** -0.08** 0.04* 0.12 -1.33* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.019) (0.175) (0.529) 
Trade openness 0.00** 0.0040* 0.03 -0.57*** 0.82 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.031) (0.162) (1.610) 
Industrial employment 3.81 4.00 0.01 -0.67 2.90 
 (2.018) (2.088) (0.029) (0.441) (1.724) 
Left government 0.0013 0.0014 -0.003 -0.002 -0.08 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.071) (0.239) 
Union density -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.01 0.38 1.51 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.018) (0.434) (1.229) 
Deficit 0.0032 0.01 0.02   
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.013)   
Social transfers   -0.07* 0.50  
   (0.027) (0.278)  
Coordination index   0.01 0.06  
   (0.013) (0.111)  
CBI    0.14  
    (0.084)  
Constant 0.39 0.50 0.43*** 6.20*** -9.15*** 
 (0.566) (0.598) (0.033) (0.362) (0.966) 
Observations 916 906 678 424 598 
R-squared     0.46 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Country fixed effects No No No No No 
Year effects No No No No No 
R-squared within model 0.17 0.17 0.31 0.59 0.46 
R-squared overall model 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.48 0.30 
R-squared between model 0.35 0.31 0.01 0.45 0.12 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05; t p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Alternative estimation methods 
 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Level of Consumer Price Inflation Binary high inflation 
dummy 
Method XTGEE XTGLS XTPCSE Logit 
Elderly -0.56* -0.44*** -0.42*** -0.23** 
 (0.258) (0.079) (0.104) (0.078) 
Real GDP growth -0.39*** -0.58*** -0.38*** -0.34*** 
 (0.036) (0. 077) (0.029) (0.064) 
Unemployment rate -0.34*** -0.03 -0.18** -0.04 
 (0.091) (0.049) (0.057) (0.060) 
Deficit 0.07 -0.32*** 0.02 -0.20* 
 (0.053) (0.061) (0.040) (0.092) 
Trade openness 0.10*** 0.01* 0.04*** 0.00 
 (0.017) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Industrial employment 28.27** 18.40*** 20.68*** 7.97 
 (9.308) (3.385) (4.076) (6.080) 
Union density -0.01 0.05*** 0.01 0.03* 
 (0.030) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) 
CBI -1.20 -3.19*** -1.95* -2.13 
 (1.277) (0.940) (0.843) (1.868) 
Coordination index -0.05 -0.47*** -0.14* -0.30* 
 (0.124) (0.141) (0.070) (0.141) 
Constant 2.02 7.54*** 5.46*** 0.10 
 (4.996) (1.545) (1.596) (2.186) 
Observations 699 699 699 699 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 
R-squared n.a. n.a. 0.19 Pseudo (0.2004) 
Details fam(gaus) 
link(iden) 
corr(ar1) 
 correlation(a
r1) 
vce(cluster id) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Table 6: Alternative samples and additional independent variables 
 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Elderly -0.66*** -0.55* -0.59** -0.48* 
Real GDP growth -0.65*** -0.71*** -0.68*** -0.10 
Unemployment rate -0.27** -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.26** 
Deficit -0.37*** -0.31*** -0.32*** -0.06 
Trade openness 0.05** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.00 
Industrial employment 8.63 12.18 9.50 14.04 
Left government 0.01 0.01* 0.01** -0.00 
Union density 0.10** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.07* 
Social transfers -0.11 -0.21 -0.18  
CBI -3.62* -4.03*** -4.31***  
Coordination -0.11 0.28 0.19  
Non-EMU dummy   -0.17  
EPL    1.60*** 
Constant 11.28** 6.30 8.84 2.75 
Observations 218 481 699 544 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 
Sub-sample Election 
years only 
Non-election 
years only 
No No 
Country fixed effects No No No No 
Time effects No No No No 
R-squared within model 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.39 
R-squared overall model 0.17 0.10 0.12 0.10 
R-squared between 
model 
0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Table 6 (continued): Alternative samples and additional independent variables 
 
Column (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Elderly -0.63*** -0.49* -0.51* -0.60** -0.74t 
Real GDP growth -0.46*** -0.67*** -0.68*** -0.70*** -0.27** 
Unemployment rate -0.08 -0.53*** -0.54*** -0.42*** -0.55*** 
Deficit -0.06 -0.32*** -0.33*** -0.31*** 0.02 
Trade openness 0.00 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.10*** 0.04 
Industrial employment 22.83*** 16.25 11.40 9.37 15.78 
Left government 0.00 0.01** 0.01*** 0.01** -0.01 
Union density  0.18*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.18** 
Social transfers  -0.15 -0.18 -0.19 0.10 
CBI  -3.45* -3.94** -4.38*** -0.75 
Bargaining coverage 0.03*     
Union authority  -5.41    
Union concentration   -3.21   
LME dummy    0.09  
Size of stock market     -0.01* 
Constant 6.33*** 2.74 3.24 7.10 5.13 
Observations 376 649 636 699 264 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 
Sub-sample No No No No No 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes No No 
Time effects No No No No No 
R-squared within 
model 
0.39 0.52 0.51 0.53 0.65 
R-squared overall 
model 
0.31 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.0034 
R-squared between 
model 
0.02 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.07 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses;*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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Dynamics of adjustments: Error Correction Model 
 
So far my results show that there is a robust association between the share of 
elderly and inflation, but say little about the dynamics of adjustment. It is for 
instance implausible that an increase in the share of elderly between time t 
and time t+1 results only or necessarily result in a change in inflation in say 
time t+2. To give a clearer sense of dynamics and as a final robustness check 
on the effect of the elderly on inflation in OECD countries, I estimate a single 
equation Error Correction Model (ECM) of the standard form: ΔInflationi,t = α 
+ β1ΔElderlyi,t + β2 Inflationi,t-1 + β3 Elderlyi,t-1 + ∑kj*Controlsj,i,t ; which can be 
re-organised as: ΔInflationi,t = α + β1ΔElderlyi,t + β2 (Inflation i,t-1 + λ Elderlyi,t-1) 
+ ∑kj*Controlsj,i,t ; where β1 is the short run immediate response of inflation to 
a rise in the share elderly and λ is the long run response and calculated as β2 * 
λ = β3  λ= β3 / β2. I include country fixed effects to account for unobserved 
country heterogeneity.  
 
Column 1 in Table 7 shows that the results for the ECM are as follows: 
ΔInflationi,t = -0.95 + 0.9 ΔElderlyi,t – 0.22 Inflationi,t-1– 0.05 Elderlyi,t-1 …; which 
can be rewritten as: ΔInflationi,t = -0.95 + 0.9 ΔElderlyi,t – 0.22 (Inflationi,t-1 + 
0.21 Elderlyi,t-1) …; where 0.9 is the short run effect of an increase in elderly on 
inflation and 0.21 is the long run effect with an adjustment process of 0.22 per 
period. In other words, the total long run effect of 1 percentage point more 
elderly is 0.21, but in t+1 this initially results in 0.21*0.22 reduction in 
inflation, in t+2, this results in 0.22*[0.21-(0.21*0.22)], and so on.  
 
The coefficient for the short run effect is not statistically significant which 
makes sense conceptually since one cannot expect inflation rates to directly 
and instantaneously respond to a change in the share of the elderly. Because 
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the estimate of the long run coefficient 0.21 is a recalculation from several 
coefficients, we need to recalculate the standard error to assess whether this 
long run effect is statistically significant. To do so, we can use the Bewley 
transformation regression. We first obtain an estimate of ΔYt by estimating an 
equation of the form: ΔYt = a + bYt-1 + bXt + bΔXt + et (shown in column 2); and 
then taking the predicted values ΔŶt to estimate Yt = a+ d0ΔŶt + d1Xt - d2ΔXt + 
mt (shown in column 3). This reveals the long run effect is significant with a 
p-value inferior to 0.05.82 Rerunning the same analysis without country fixed 
effects is substantially the same but the magnitude of the long run effect is 
larger. 
 
Table 7: Single Equation Error Correction Model 
 
Column  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Inflation first difference Inflation rate 
Lagged inflation -0.22*** -0.22***  
Elderly     
First difference 0.19 0.24 1.09 
Lagged -0.05   
Level  -0.05 -0.21* 
GDP growth    
First difference -0.37*** -0.35*** -1.59*** 
Lagged -0.02   
Level  -0.02 -0.08 
Unemployment    
First difference -0.34* -0.11 -0.51** 
Lagged -0.23**   
Level  -0.23** -1.03*** 
Trade openness    
First difference 0.15** 0.13** 0.61*** 
Lagged 0.02   
Level  0.02 0.08*** 
Central Bank Independence     
First difference -0.59 0.23 1.03 
Lagged -0.81   
Level  -0.81 -3.71*** 
Share of industrial employment    
First difference 5.93 0.19 0.85 
Lagged 5.74   
Level  5.74 26.14*** 
Deficit    
                                                        
82  In using the Bewley (1979) transformation, we follow previous literature, see De 
Boef  and Keele 2008. 
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Column  (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Inflation first difference Inflation rate 
First difference 0.08 0.18*** 0.82*** 
Lagged -0.10*   
Level  -0.10* -0.46*** 
Left share of cabinet    
First difference 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Lagged 0.00   
Level  0.00 0.01** 
Union density    
First difference -0.02 -0.05 -0.23*** 
Lagged 0.03   
Level  0.03 0.13*** 
Wage coordination    
First difference 0.02 -0.07 -0.33** 
Lagged 0.10   
Level  0.10 0.44* 
Predicted change in inflation 
rates (from column 2) 
  -3.55*** 
Constant -0.95 -0.95 -4.34* 
Observations 678 678 678 
R-squared 0.36 0.36 0.81 
Number of countries 21 21 21 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time effects No No No 
R-squared within model 0.36 0.36 0.81 
R-squared overall model 0.22 0.22 0.79 
R-squared between model 0.33 0.33 0.79 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. 
 
World sample 
 
We have now seen that the share of the elderly is robustly associated with 
inflation rates across OECD countries and I have provided some evidence for 
the existence of the causal mechanism that my argument implies. One 
problem with focusing on OECD countries is that the secular rise in the share 
of the old coincides with several structural changes in the economic structures 
of OECD economies. To address this issue, I collected data on a much larger 
sample including 216 countries83 which also allows me to investigate whether 
                                                        
83 Depending on specifications, there are between 216 and about 100 countries, because data 
availability is not the same for different variables. 
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my argument ‘travels’ to developing and emerging economies. In table 8, I 
test my argument on this sample in the period between 1960 and 2013 
(though this varies depending on the country and the full model only covers 
recent times). An issue with this larger sample is that some countries exhibit 
particularly high levels of inflation (sometimes above 100%) which may bias 
the analysis. Table 8 shows results with different criteria for excluding 
outliers: column (1) imposes no restrictions, in column (2) I exclude 
observations where inflation is above 100%, and in column (3) I do the same 
for a lower cut-off point of 50%. Excluding observations ‘wastes’ information 
so I also try an alternative which consists of using a logarithmic 
transformation of the dependent variable: this compresses the values for 
outliers but does not exclude them84. Column (4) shows results with neither 
country nor time effects, column (5) includes time effects, and column (6) 
includes both time and country effects. In all specifications, the share of 
elderly is negatively associated with inflation. 
 
A downside of having such a large coverage of countries is that data 
availability is not as good as for OECD countries. Nevertheless, columns (7) to 
(10) introduce – stepwise - additional variables85 that are available for some of 
my sample: GPD growth (column 7), unemployment rate (column 8), an 
index of democracy and the size of stock market (column 9), and left control 
of the executive (column 10). In column (11), I include country fixed effects to 
see whether this changes the results. In column 12, I include a measure of 
output gap which is not statistically significant. The results concerning the 
effect of elderly on inflation are robust throughout. 
 
A final issue concerns ruling out alternative causal mechanisms through 
                                                        
84 A downside is that this focuses only on positive values, since negative values become 0 after 
the logarithmic transformation. 
85 The sources and description for the variables are available in table A2 in the appendix. 
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which a larger share of elderly in the population could affect inflation rates. 
My argument is that the impact of the elderly operates through the electoral 
arena. However, if older people have different – less inflationary – 
consumption and investment behaviours, I could observe a negative 
association that does not work through the electoral mechanism. I have 
already attempted to substantiate my causal mechanism by showing that the 
share of elderly affect both party manifestos and policies that influence 
inflation rates.  
 
One way to rule out a non-electoral mechanism is to compare the effect of the 
elderly on inflation rates in countries with different degrees of democracy, 
which I measure using an additive index of the degree of democracy that 
takes values between 0 and 10 (where higher values suggest the country is 
more democratic). To give a sense of which countries the index identifies as 
fully democratic, I plot the change in the consumer price index against the 
share of the elderly in all countries that have a score of 10 in Figure 5. In 
column (13) of table 8, I interact the share of elderly with this index of 
democracy. The interaction effect cannot directly be interpreted from the 
table 86 . Figure 6 plots the marginal effect of the elderly on inflation 
conditional on democracy and shows that the share of elderly is only 
negatively and significantly associated when countries have a democratic 
score of 9 or 10 (i.e. when they have high democracy scores). If the causal 
mechanism operated mainly through a non-electoral arena, the effect would 
be statistically significant regardless of the degree of democracy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
86 See Kam and Francese 2007. 
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Figure 5: CPI and share of population above 65 in all countries with a democratic 
score of 10 
  
Note: democratic countries score of 10 using institutionalised democracy index, year 2000. 
 
 
Table 8: Results for world sample 
 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent 
variable 
CPI CPI CPI Ln(CPI) Ln(CPI) Ln(CPI) 
Population>65 -6.78* -1.15*** -0.91*** -0.12*** -0.10*** -0.20*** 
(% of total) (2.916) (0.272) (0.169) (0.013) (0.015) (0.028) 
Constant 41.64** 8.48*** 7.41*** 2.62*** 1.51*** 1.91*** 
Observations 6,505 6,371 6,232 6,182 6,182 6,182 
Number of 
countries 
175 175 175 175 175 175 
Country fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Period 1961-
2013 
1961-
2013 
1961-
2013 
1961-
2013 
1961-
2013 
1961-
2013 
Restrictions on 
sample 
None CPI<100 CPI<50 Logarithm in 
logarithm 
in 
logarithm 
R-squared overall 
model 
0.01 0.08 0.13 0.03 0.15 0.11 
Note: robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. 
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Table 8 (continued): Results for world sample 
 
Column (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)  (13) 
Dependent variable CPI CPI CPI CPI Ln(CPI) CPI CPI 
Population>65 -1.11*** -0.35*** -0.30* -0.30* -0.19*** -0.183* 0.84 
(% of total) (0.277) (0.085) (0.137) (0.137) (0.056) (0.0974) (0.490) 
GDP growth -0.12** -0.12* -0.30*** -0.31*** -0.03** -0.100** -0.14* 
 (0.044) (0.050) (0.084) (0.084) (0.009) (0.0495) (0.067) 
Unemployment 
rate 
 -0.02 -0.11 -0.11 -0.04* -0.133 0.01 
(ILO definition)  (0.107) (0.119) (0.119) (0.018) (0.0890) (0.106) 
Democratic index   -0.32 -0.33 -0.03 -1.142*** 0.24 
   (0.240) (0.238) (0.023) (0.429) (0.314) 
Stock traded   0.01* 0.01* 0.00* -0.00088  
(% GDP)   (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.00163)  
Left control     0.15 -0.09   
of executive    (0.606) (0.093)   
Output gap      0.0200  
      (0.0636)  
Pop>65*Democracy       -0.12* 
       (0.056) 
Constant 9.02*** 18.44*** 20.29*** 20.29*** 4.63*** 20.73*** 15.27*** 
Observations 5,924 3,280 1,859 1,859 1,816 554 3,013 
Number of 
countries 
175 163 105 105 105 26 154 
Country fixed 
effects 
Yes No No No Yes No No 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period 1961-
2013 
1992-
2013 
1992-
2012 
1992-
2012 
1992-
2012 
1992-
2012 
1992-
2013 
Restrictions on 
sample 
under 
100 
under 
100 
under 
100 
under 
100 
logarithm Under 
100 
under 
100 
R-squared overall 
model 
0.08 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09  0.14 
Note: robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * 
p<0.05. Results concerning the interaction effect from column (13) cannot be directly 
interpreted; instead refer to Figure 6. There is limited international data for output so the 
sample drops from 105 countries to 26 countries but still include countries that were not in 
tables 5 and 6 which only included 21 OECD countries: Estonia, Cyprus, Korea, Slovak 
Republic, and Slovenia. 
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Figure 6: Effect of share of elderly on inflation depending on degree of democracy 
 
Note: results from column 12 in table 8. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
The conventional wisdom in the comparative political economy literature 
analysing the determinants of inflation emphasises the role of ideas and 
institutions, and to a lesser extent interest group politics. While valuable, this 
paper has argued that by neglecting the role of domestic interests in the 
electoral arena, these explanations miss out an important determinant of 
cross-national variation in inflation rates and a potent explanation for the 
relative success of different ideas and institutions. For both methodological 
and theoretical reasons, this paper has focused on the share of elderly to show 
how electoral politics affects inflation rates.  
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Specifically, I have argued that countries with a larger share of elderly should 
exhibit lower inflation because these voters are more inflation averse and 
sufficiently politically powerful to influence government preferences for 
inflation. My findings support my argument: older voters are more inflation 
averse, countries with more elderly have more economically orthodox 
political parties, higher central bank independence, and ultimately lower 
inflation. I have tested this latter association between the elderly and inflation 
rates using a wide variety of specifications, methods, and samples (including 
a very large sample including all countries in the world for which there is 
data). My results further show that the magnitude of this effect is sufficiently 
strong to suggest we were missing an important determinant of inflation 
rates. 
 
Though this is a fairly circumscribed finding considering the effect of only 
one key factor – the share of elderly - on one main economic outcome – 
inflation, this represents an important contribution to the comparative 
political economy literature in three ways.  
 
First, this shows convincingly that domestic electoral politics, not just 
institutions, ideas, or interest groups, also matter for explaining inflation 
rates. Further research should analyse the impact of other electoral groups on 
inflation. For instance, it might be the case that electoral groups that are more 
insulated from the risk of unemployment, for instance because of higher 
employment protection legislation, and have housing assets, are more 
concerned about inflation than about unemployment. This may point to other 
sources of possible electoral support for low inflation in the electorate.  
 
Second, this suggests ageing societies may have important effects on other 
economic outcomes and policies. The impact of ageing on other economic 
Tim Vlandas 
        
45 
outcomes would represent a valuable avenue for further research. For 
instance, it might be that the elderly’s comparatively lower concern for labour 
market performance make them indifferent to austerity policies that do not 
affect them directly; e.g. lower spending on labour market policies (as 
opposed to austerity that do affect them such as pension or health care cuts). 
This would explain the surprising electoral viability of certain austerity 
policies that would have been expected to lead to a greater electoral backlash.  
 
Finally, as countries’ populations continue to age, the political imperative to 
keep inflation low may supersede even pareto superior economic policies. 
Ageing may have represented a powerful driver behind the move to a low 
inflation regime in the past decades. As Western countries continue to age, 
this may lock us into a political equilibrium that is increasingly sub-optimal 
from an economic point of view. 
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Appendix 
Table A1: Descriptive statistics, description and sources for OECD sample 
 
Variables N Mean Std Dev min max Descriptions Sources 
Inflation 1,110 5.098 4.761 -4.480 31.02 Growth of Consumer Price Index (all 
items).Percentage change from 
previous year. 
Armingeon et al. 2014:14. 
Share of elderly 1,113 13.249 3.024 5.727 24.15 Population over 65 as a percentage of 
the whole population. 
Armingeon et al. 2014:27. 
Real GDP growth 1,092 3.048 2.796 -8.539 13.20 Percent change from previous year. Armingeon et al. 2014:13. 
Unemployment 
rate 
1,113 5.743 4.044 0 25.13 Unemployment rate as a percentage of 
the civilian labour force. 
Armingeon et al. 2014:18. 
Openness 1,091 60.075 30.789 9.354 187.8 Measured as total trade (sum of 
import and export)  
as a percentage of GDP, in current 
prices. 
Armingeon et al. 2014:12. 
Deficit 992 -.0754 3.529 -28.03 16.10 Annual deficit excluding net interest 
payments (government primary 
balance), percentage of GDP. 
Armingeon et al. 2014:15. 
Debt 896 60.316 32.127 6.291 218.801 Gross government debt (financial 
liabilities) as a percentage of GDP. 
Armingeon et al. 2014: 10 
Central Bank 
Independence 
849 .408 .189 0.0900 0.920 The Cukeirman-Webb-Neyapti Index 
for Central Bank Independence 
Cukeirman et al. 1992. 
Updated using Simone 
Polillo and Mauro F. 
Guillén, “Globalization 
Pressures and the State: 
The Global Spread of 
Central Bank 
Independence.” American 
Journal of Sociology 110(6) 
(May 2005):1764-1802. 
Wage 1,056 3.168 1.358 1 5 Degrees of Coordination among Visser 2013:9-10. 
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Variables N Mean Std Dev min max Descriptions Sources 
coordination different Institutions for Wage Setting. 
Left control of 
cabinet 
1,072 33.014 38.129 0 100 Cabinet posts of social-democratic 
and other left parties in percentage of 
total cabinet posts.  
Armingeon et al. 2014:3. 
Union density 1,032 41.151 19.86 7.600 100 Net union membership as a 
proportion of wage and salary earners 
in employment. 
Armingeon et al. 2014:20. 
Social transfer 1,089 12.633 4.059 2.300 23.66 Social security transfers as a 
percentage of GDP. 
Armingeon et al. 2014:21. 
Industry 1,111 .3099 .0713 0.115 0.493 Civilian employment in industry as a 
proportion of whole civilian 
employment. 
Armingeon et al. 2014:21. 
Employment 
protection 
legislation for 
regular workers 
(OECD) 
583 2.12 0.92 9.26 5 Employment protection strictness 
provided through legislation and as a 
result of enforcement processes. Scale 
of 0-6; higher values indicate strict-er 
employment protection 
Armingeon et al. 2014:21. 
Adjusted 
bargaining 
coverage 
407 55.155 27.253 13 99 Bargaining Coverage, adjusted. 
Expressed in percentage 
Armingeon et al. 2014 (but 
originally created by Jelle 
Visser) 
Union authority 941 0.440 0.210 0.1 0.9 Summary measure of formal authority 
of unions regarding wage setting at 
peak and sectoral level 
ICTWSS - http://www.uva-
aias.net/ 
Union 
concentration 
923 0.311 0.114 0.113 0.587 Summary measure of concentration of 
unions at peak and sectoral level 
ICTWSS - http://www.uva-
aias.net/ 
Capital openness 871 1.440 1.267 -1.875 2.421 Index for the degree of openness in 
capital account transactions 
The Chinn- Ito Index. 
Armingeon et al. 2014  
Structural 
unemployment 
1073 1.987 2.017 0 7 Structural unemployment OECD 
Home ownership 678 54.966 12.922 28 78 Housing owner occupation rate  Data created by Andrew 
Oswald 
EPL (allard 
index) 
814 1.622 1.101 0 4.1 This series uses the OECD 
methodology generating an index 
Allard, G. (2005a), 
“Measuring Job Security 
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Variables N Mean Std Dev min max Descriptions Sources 
increasing on the range {0,5}. Over Time: In Search of a 
Historical Indicator”, 
Instituto de Empressa 
Working Paper WP-05. 
(Available from 
http://www.ie.edu/eng/cla
ustro/claustro_working_pa
pers.asp) 
LME dummy 1113 0.285 0.451 0 1 Takes value if country is considered to 
be a Liberal Market Economy 
(Australia, Canada, Ireland, New 
Zealand, UK and USA) 
Own calculations 
Non-EMU 
dummy 
1113 0.850 0.356 0 1 Takes value 1 for all countries prior to 
1999. After 1999, only takes value 1 
for all non-EMU countries: United 
States, Norway, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Sweden, 
Japan, Canada, New Zealand, 
Australia. (exception is Greece that 
keeps value 1 until 2001, and is coded 
0 thereafter, as a result of late 
accession to EMU) 
Own calculations 
Number of 
countries 
21 n.a. n.a. 1 21 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
UK and USA. 
Own calculation 
Note: Armingeon et al. 2014 can be accessed at: 
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_eng.html  
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Table A2: Description and sources for world sample 
 
Variables Descriptions Sources 
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %). Inflation as measured by the 
consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost 
to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services 
that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The 
Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
International Monetary Fund, 
International Financial Statistics and 
data files. 
Elderly  Population ages 65 and above as a percentage of the total population. 
Population is based on the de facto definition of population, which 
counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship--except for 
refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are 
generally considered part of the population of the country of origin. 
The United Nations Population 
Division's World Population Prospects 
GDP growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. 
dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not 
included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and 
degradation of natural resources. 
World Bank national accounts data, 
and OECD National Accounts data files. 
Unemployment rate Unemployment refers to the share of the labor force that is without 
work but available for and seeking employment. 
International Labour Organization, Key 
Indicators of the Labour Market 
database. 
Democratic index Institutionalised Democracy index. Democracy is conceived as three 
essential, interdependent elements. One is the presence of institutions 
and procedures through which citizens can express effective 
preferences about alternative policies and leaders. Second is the 
existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by 
the executive. Third is the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in 
their daily lives and in acts of political participation. Other aspects of 
plural democracy, such as the rule of law, systems of checks and 
balances, freedom of the press, and so on are means to, or specific 
manifestations of, these general principles. The Democracy indicator is 
an additive eleven-point scale (0-10).  
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Variables Descriptions Sources 
Stock traded Stocks traded refers to the total value of shares traded during the 
period. This indicator complements the market capitalization ratio by 
showing whether market size is matched by trading. 
Standard & Poor's, Global Stock 
Markets Factbook and supplemental 
S&P data. 
Left control  Executive control by Right (1); Left (3); Center (2); No executive (NA). 
Recoded as a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if control by left and 
0 otherwise. See page Beck et al. (2001):7-9. 
Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto 
Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 
2001. "New tools in comparative 
political economy: The Database of 
Political Institutions." 15:1, 165-176 
(September), World Bank Economic 
Review. 
Output gap Output gap in percent of potential GDP (Percent of potential GDP). 
Output gaps for advanced economies are calculated as actual GDP less 
potential GDP as a percent of potential GDP. Estimates of output gaps 
are subject to a significant margin of uncertainty. For a discussion of 
approaches to calculating potential output, see Paula R. De Masi, IMF 
Estimates of Potential Output: Theory and Practice, in Staff Studies for 
the World Economic Outlook (Washington: IMF, December 1997), pp. 
40-46. 
International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database, 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft
/weo/2015/01/weodata/index.aspx 
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Table A3: Testing the effect of additional factors 
 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Inflation 0.86***      
(lagged once) (0.024)      
Elderly -0.10* -0.77*** -0.74** -0.99*** -0.98*** -0.81*** 
(lagged in columns 2&3) (0.044) (0.227) (0.241) (0.144) (0.203) (0.216) 
Real GDP growth -0.06 -0.57*** -0.55*** -0.61*** -0.65*** -0.67*** 
 (0.057) (0.070) (0.064) (0.066) (0.059) (0.069) 
Unemployment rate -0.11** -0.56*** -0.67*** -0.42*** -0.58*** -0.49*** 
(lagged in columns 2&3) (0.036) (0.110) (0.103) (0.091) (0.073) (0.093) 
Deficit 0.01 -0.34*** -0.33** -0.19 -0.19 -0.29** 
(lagged in columns 2&3) (0.038) (0.097) (0.094) (0.103) (0.099) (0.107) 
Trade openness 0.01 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.03** 0.08** 0.07*** 
(lagged in columns 2&3) (0.004) (0.015) (0.022) (0.009) (0.020) (0.013) 
Left control of cabinet 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01* 
(lagged in columns 2&3) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Union density -0.00 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.09*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 
(lagged in columns 2&3) (0.005) (0.044) (0.048) (0.027) (0.039) (0.041) 
Central bank independence -0.15 -2.53 -3.03* 1.86 0.33 -3.45** 
 (0.479) (1.342) (1.440) (1.378) (1.501) (1.317) 
Capital openness    -1.60*** -1.18**  
    (0.341) (0.351)  
Structural unemployment      0.21 
      (0.369) 
Constant 2.64*** 11.19*** 7.62* 19.71*** 13.87*** 12.19*** 
Observations 698 688 688 580 580 699 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Country fixed effects No No Yes No Yes No 
Time effects No No No No No No 
R-squared within model 0.75 0.51 0.51 0.65 0.68 0.51 
R-squared overall model 0.80 0.10 0.07 0.42 0.20 0.09 
R-squared between model 0.98 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.00 0.07 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. 
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Table A3 (continued): Testing the effect of additional factors 
Column (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Elderly -0.80** -0.43* -0.71** -0.72** -0.74* -1.06*** -0.91*** 
(lagged in columns 3&4) (0.234) (0.176) (0.192) (0.261) (0.268) (0.224) (0.218) 
Real GDP growth -0.71*** -0.54*** -0.59*** -0.68*** -0.70*** -0.61*** -0.66*** 
 (0.060) (0.077) (0.060) (0.063) (0.059) (0.072) (0.064) 
Unemployment rate -0.63*** -0.49*** -0.92*** -0.46*** -0.59*** -0.45*** -0.63*** 
(lagged in columns 3&4) (0.084) (0.109) (0.106) (0.076) (0.059) (0.093) (0.083) 
Deficit -0.26* -0.35* -0.30* -0.28** -0.26* -0.24* -0.23* 
(lagged in columns 3&4) (0.108) (0.147) (0.128) (0.106) (0.103) (0.111) (0.106) 
Trade openness 0.12*** 0.03 0.19*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 0.03 0.09** 
(lagged in columns 3&4) (0.024) (0.018) (0.043) (0.017) (0.026) (0.014) (0.027) 
Left control of cabinet 0.01** 0.02* 0.02* 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.01** 
(lagged in columns 3&4) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Union density 0.22*** 0.06* 0.19** 0.16*** 0.21*** 0.13** 0.20*** 
(lagged in columns 3&4) (0.047) (0.029) (0.049) (0.045) (0.050) (0.039) (0.048) 
Central bank independence -4.23** -3.65 -0.90 -3.57** -4.33** -1.68 -3.14 
 (1.319) (2.721) (1.777) (1.217) (1.357) (1.609) (1.522) 
Structural unemployment -0.08       
 (0.550)       
Home ownership  0.12** 0.13     
  (0.045) (0.097)     
Industry    9.97 5.98   
    (8.183) (8.726)   
EPL      1.65*** 0.97 
(Allard index)      (0.432) (0.498) 
Constant 8.45 19.17*** 14.43* 7.24 5.53 16.30*** 10.40*** 
Observations 699 535 535 699 699 573 573 
Number of countries 21 19 19 21 21 20 20 
Country fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Time effects No No No No No No No 
R-squared within model 0.53 0.48 0.54 0.52 0.53 0.56 0.58 
R-squared overall model 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.09 
R-squared between model 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.0 
The impact of the elderly on inflation rates in developed countries 
 
 
58 
Table A4: Excluding inflationary periods from analysis of determinants of 
inflation 
 
Column (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Inflation rate 
Share of elderly -3.49** -3.27* -2.07** 
 (1.266) (1.472) (0.704) 
GDP growth -1.64*** -1.62*** -0.70*** 
 (0.305) (0.325) (0.150) 
Unemployment rate -1.83** -2.25*** -1.12* 
 (0.580) (0.550) (0.511) 
Deficit -0.70* -0.71* 0.11 
 (0.285) (0.285) (0.137) 
Trade openness 1.22 1.68 0.27 
 (0.806) (1.200) (0.344) 
Share of industrial employment 2.57** 2.02 2.81*** 
 (0.830) (1.020) (0.563) 
Left share of cabinet seats 0.03 -0.08 -0.37 
 (0.167) (0.175) (0.215) 
Union density 2.96* 4.31** 0.87 
 (1.153) (1.496) (0.541) 
Social security transfers -1.02 -0.91 0.47 
 (0.576) (0.662) (0.370) 
Central Bank Independence 0.06 -0.06 -0.13 
 (0.249) (0.288) (0.174) 
Wage coordination  -1.12** -0.97* -1.00** 
 (0.425) (0.389) (0.384) 
Constant 7.35*** 7.51*** 5.60*** 
 (1.090) (0.289) (1.161) 
Observations 406 406 210 
Period Post-1980 Post-1980 Post-1990 
Number of countries 21 21 21 
Country fixed effects No Yes No 
Time effects No No No 
R-squared within model 0.70 0.70 0.58 
R-squared overall model 0.19 0.11 0.03 
R-squared between model 0.01 0.02 0.10 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. All 
independent variables are standardised with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
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Table A5: Determinants of central bank independence 
 
Column  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Central bank independence index Increase in CBI 
(binary) 
Share of elderly 0.13*** 0.13** 0.14** 1.01* 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.044) (0.430) 
GDP growth 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.43 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.376) 
Unemployment rate 0.03 0.03 0.05* 0.29* 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.120) 
Deficit 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.36* 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.169) 
Trade openness 0.06* 0.07* 0.07 0.36 
 (0.028) (0.031) (0.037) (0.233) 
Share of industrial employment 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.032) (0.320) 
Left share of cabinet seats -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.27 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.158) 
Union density -0.01 -0.00 0.01 -0.72** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.254) 
Social security transfers -0.08** -0.08** -0.05 -0.15 
 (0.027) (0.028) (0.023) (0.338) 
Wage coordination 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.42 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.269) 
Constant 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.56*** -4.03*** 
Observations 699 699 699 699 
Number of countries 21 21 21 21 
Country fixed effects No Yes Yes No 
Time effects No No Yes No 
R-squared within model 0.37 0.37 0.58  
R-squared overall model 0.08 0.06 0.11  
R-squared between model 0.01 0.00 0.00  
Pseudo R-squared    0.16 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. All 
independent variables are standardised with mean 0 and standard deviation 1. 
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Table A6: Linking elderly to economic orthodoxy, central bank independence and 
inflation rates 
 
Column (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Economic 
orthodoxy 
Central Bank 
independence 
Inflation rate 
Share of elderly 0.19*** 0.04** -0.33** 
 (0.065) (0.017) (0.167) 
Inflation rate -0.08   
 (0.082)   
Inflation rate  -0.00  
(lagged once)  (0.008)  
Unemployment rate -0.02  -0.05 
 (0.067)  (0.103) 
Unemployment rate  0.01  
(lagged once)  (0.011)  
Deficit 0.04 0.00 -0.13 
 (0.078) (0.012) (0.091) 
Trade openness 0.01 0.00** -0.00 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.011) 
Left share of cabinet seats 0.01* 0.00 0.02 
 (0.005) (0.001) (0.015) 
Economic orthodoxy  0.02*  
(lagged once)  (0.009)  
Central bank    -0.22 
Independence   (2.067) 
Economic orthodoxy   -0.25* 
(party manifesto)   (0.147) 
(1960s reference) (0.818)  (0.747) 
1980s dummy 0.56 -0.11** 4.82*** 
(1960s reference) (0.932) (0.046) (1.362) 
1990s dummy -1.04 -0.13** 0.38 
(1960s reference) (0.710) (0.055) (1.087) 
2000s dummy -2.26*** -0.06 -0.32 
(1960s reference) (0.690) (0.077) (1.019) 
Constant -0.14 -0.38 8.29*** 
 (1.204) (0.251) (1.902) 
Observations 94 78 94 
R-squared 0.21 0.73  
Number of countries 21 21 21 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes No 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared within model 0.21 0.73 0.78 
R-squared overall model 0.04 0.29 0.61 
R-squared between model 0.00 0.07 0.32 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. 
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